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Abstract
This paper describes individuals’ inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redis-
tributive preferences in a panel of OECD countries, primarily focusing on the association
between these subjective measures and the effective level of inequality and redistribution.
Not surprisingly, the effective level of redistribution (after tax-and-transfer inequality) is
positively (negatively) correlated with redistributive preferences. There is also evidence
showing that the subjective and objective dimension of inequality and redistribution are,
at least partially, linked with individuals’ political preferences and their voting behavior.
The association between objective and subjective measures of inequality and redistri-
bution vanishes, however, once more fundamental country characteristics are taken into
account. This suggests that these characteristics explain both redistributive preferences
as well as the effective level of redistribution and after tax-and-transfer inequality.
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1 Introduction
The redistribution of income and wealth is an issue of utmost economic and political significance,
as a substantial amount of resources is redistributed in all OECD member countries. In the
mid-2000s, for example, overall public cash benefits amounted to 15.8%, and household taxes
to 31.1% of average household income among working age people (OECD, 2008). Even more
remarkably, public cash benefits (as a percentage of household income) among working age
individuals range from a low of about 6% in the United States to a high of as much as 30%
in Poland, while household taxes range from a low of about 21% in Ireland to a high of about
54% in Denmark and Iceland. Looking at these numbers, it is both important and natural to
ask why countries differ so much with respect to the amount of resources that are redistributed
and, consequently, the level of after tax-and-transfer inequality.1
It seems very natural to take country differences in redistributive preferences as a starting
point when trying to explain the variation in the effective level of redistribution across countries.
Indeed, many researchers appear to share the view that individuals’ subjective perceptions and
attitudes play an important role in explaining the observed country differences in inequality
and redistribution. For example, Alesina and Angeletos (2005, p.960) argue that “(...) the
difference in political support for redistribution appears (...) to reflect a difference in social
perceptions regarding the fairness of market outcomes and the underlying sources of income
inequality”. Such arguments are backed by empirical evidence from Alesina et al. (2001), for
example, who show that there is a close relationship between social expenditure and the belief
that luck is important in determining one’s income at the aggregate level. Consistent with
this evidence, some recent theoretical papers have forcefully pushed the idea that individuals’
redistributive preferences and the effective amount of redistribution should be viewed as si-
multaneously determined and thus in equilibrium, at least in the short-run. In Piketty (1995),
individuals imperfectly learn about the relative importance of effort and luck in determining
their own income from their own experience and, depending on their beliefs, decide on their
preferred tax rate. The optimal level of effort will in turn depend on the chosen tax rate. The
1See Doerrenberg and Peichl (2012) for an econometric analysis of the association between explicit redis-
tributive policies (e.g. public social expenditure) and the reduction in income inequality effectively attained.
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setup is similar in the model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), where different beliefs about
the relative role of ascribed versus acquired characteristics in determining individual earnings
lead voters to choose different tax rates. The tax rate, in turn, will determine the monetary
return on individual effort. The effective return on individual effort will then either reinforce or
weaken the belief in the relative importance of individual effort. The basic setup is similar in
the model of Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), where individuals feel a need to believe in a just world
because such a belief helps them convince themselves, and/or their children, that personal ef-
fort will pay off. If a majority of individuals ends up with such beliefs, they will implement
a low tax rate. At the same time, if individuals expect taxes to be low, this will strengthen
their belief that individual effort will ultimately materialize. One important common feature of
these models is that multiple equilibria are possible, and thus they are all able to reproduce the
stylized distinction between Europeans and Americans, i.e. a “European” equilibrium where
the belief is prevalent that luck determines income, with a high demand for redistribution,
and consequently a high level of redistribution; as well as an “American” equilibrium where
the belief in one’s effort is prevalent, with a low level of redistributive preferences, and with a
correspondingly low amount of redistribution.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, empirical evidence on the association between redistribu-
tive preferences and the effective level of redistribution is quite limited.2 One of the available
studies using cross-country data is Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002). Even they do not mainly fo-
cus on differences across countries, they do present some evidence suggesting that there are
large differences in redistributive preferences across different countries. Specifically, they find
large differences in redistributive preferences between former socialist countries and Western
democracies. Probably the most comprehensive descriptive evidence on country differences in
redistributive preferences to date comes from Osberg and Smeeding (2006). Interestingly, they
show that there are many more features in the variation of redistributive preferences across
countries than the contrast between the US and Europe. For example, they show that there
is more polarization of attitudes and less concern for reducing wage differentials at the bottom
2Most of the available empirical studies focus on the determinants of individual-level preferences for redis-
tribution, most often only using data from one single country (e.g. Alesina and Giuliano, 2009; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005; Fong, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000).
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of the wage distribution among Americans than among Europeans. While they use a similar
conceptual framework to that which I use in this paper, they do not relate country differences
in their measure of redistributive preferences to differences in objective measures of inequality
or redistribution. Isaksson and Lindskog (2009) focus on cross-country variation in the effect
of social norms on preferences for redistribution. They find that the association between redis-
tributive preferences and social norms differs widely across countries, and that these differences
explain part of the observed country differences in redistributive preferences. Again, however,
they do not relate their subjective measure of redistributive preferences with some objective
measure of either the effective level of inequality or the effective level of redistribution.
This paper builds on and extends the existing empirical literature using internationally com-
parable survey data covering eighteen different OECD member countries (regions within the
same country in a few cases, such as former East and West Germany) and three different points
in time (i.e. 1987, 1992, and 1999). Moreover, the empirical analysis is based on a simple yet
intuitive conceptual framework which is almost ideally suited for tackling the following issues,
which also present the main contributions of this paper. First, it presents extensive empirical
evidence for this significant group of countries on the hypothesized association of individuals’
subjective perceptions of inequality and distributional norms with the effective level of inequal-
ity and the effective extent of redistribution. At the aggregate level, I find that the difference
in the Gini coefficient of disposable household income before and after taxes and transfers, to-
tal public social expenditure, as well as after tax-and-transfer household income inequality are
strongly and significantly associated with individuals’ redistributive preferences. Second, this
paper provides evidence on how these two dimensions might be linked together at the individ-
ual level. Specifically, I show that there is a strong association between individuals’ subjective
evaluations of inequality and their more general political preferences, such as their support for
progressive taxation. Third and finally, my empirical analysis also shows that this association
vanishes once additional, and arguably more fundamental country characteristics, such as spe-
cific political institutions or ethnic fractionalization, are taken into account. Taken together,
these results suggest that while redistributive preferences and the effective level of redistribution
are in a short-run equilibrium, they are both ultimately driven by more fundamental national
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characteristics such as a country’s political institutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the main data
source. Section 3 briefly describes the conceptual framework. Section 4 presents descriptive
evidence on the diversity of inequality perceptions and distributional norms both across coun-
tries and over time. Section 5 provides econometric evidence on the hypothesized association
between subjective and objective inequality measures, as well as on the association between
subjective inequality measures and individuals’ more general political preferences, representing
one potential mechanism linking the two dimensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
I primarily rely on data from three surveys on the causes and consequences of social inequality
administered by and available from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).3 The first
survey on social inequality was run in 1987, the second in 1992, and the third followed in
1999. Moreover, a fourth survey was administered in 2009, but these data are not yet (but
should soon be) available to researchers. The number of participating countries has steadily
increased over time. While only ten countries participated in the first survey, the number
of participating countries has increased steadily and about thirty countries participated in
the 1999 survey. Because of restricted data availability for some additional aggregate-level
variables, I had to restrict the analysis to 21 OECD member countries (or, in a few cases,
regions within the same country, such as East and West Germany). Moreover, because the
number of participating countries has steadily increased over time, the data are unbalanced on
the longitudinal dimension and I end up with a maximum of 38 observations in the aggregate
level analysis. Table 1 shows the number of available observations, both at the individual and
the aggregate levels.
Table 1
3The ISSP is a collaboration of various national survey organizations which administers one survey a year
with an alternating core theme such as religion, work orientations, or social inequality. See the organization’s
homepage for more information: www.issp.org.
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I will use some additional, aggregate-level variables from various other sources, such as ag-
gregate income or the effective level of inequality (measured as the Gini coefficient in disposable
household income, either before or after taxes and transfer payments) in the empirical analysis.
These additional variables, and their sources, are listed in appendix table A.1, along with some
basic descriptives.
3 Conceptual Framework
In will now discuss how to construct subjective measures of inequality perceptions and distri-
butional norms, as well as a measure of individuals’ normative assessment of market justice,
drawing on a simple conceptual framework proposed by and discussed in more detail in Kuhn
(2011). The framework is fundamentally based on individuals’ subjective wage estimates for
people working in different occupations, such as a bus driver, a skilled worker in a factory, or a
doctor in general practice (see appendix B for the exact wording of the questions and additional
details).
3.1 Objective Wages
The natural starting point is the conventional measurement of objective wage inequality, how-
ever. One of the most routinely used and best known inequality measures is the Gini coefficient.
The computation of the Gini coefficient is usually based on individual-level wage data, but it
is possible to approximate the individual-level Gini coefficient using group-level data on wages
(e.g. Gastwirth and Glauberman, 1976). Indeed, observing wage information for only two dis-
tinct groups of individuals suffices in principle for approximating the underlying inequality of
individual wages.
Formally, assume that there are only two distinct, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive groups
of wage earners (labeled bottom and top group, respectively, below) and that we observe the
following information describing the distribution of wages across these two groups:
y ≡
(
y
bottom
, y
top
, fbottom
)
, (1)
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with y
bottom
and y
top
denoting the average wage within the bottom and the top group of wage
earners, respectively, and with fbottom denoting the fraction of the population that belongs to
the bottom group.4 The Gini coefficient in this simplified setup turns out to be equal to the
difference between the population share of the bottom group and the wage share of the bottom
group (see Kuhn, 2011):5
G = fbottom − qbottom (2)
In the scenario with only two distinct groups of wage earners, the Gini coefficient is thus simply
given by the difference between the population share and the wage share of the bottom group.
3.2 Subjective Wage Estimates
The simplified setup formalized by equations (1) and (2) can also be applied to the case of
subjective wage estimates which are available from the ISSP data, subject to two modifications.
The first modification is due to the fact that there are two conceptually distinct wage estimates
from an individual’s subjective point of view: actual and ethical wage estimates. While actual
wage estimates refer to wages that people perceive to actually prevail within a given group,
ethical wage estimates refer to wages they would judge as legitimate the same given group.6
The second modification is simply due to the fact that both actual and ethical wage estimates
will usually differ across individuals. This implies that the wage shares of the two groups,
and thus subjective inequality measures in general, become individual-specific quantities.7 We
4Because there are only two groups of wage earners, and because these two groups represent the overall
population of wage earners, the two population shares must add up to one. This implies that the two population
shares are given by fbottom and (1− fbottom) = ftop, respectively.
5Note that the average wage in the population is given by y = ybottom · fbottom + ytop · ftop. This implies that
the wage share of the bottom group is given by qbottom = (fbottom · ybottom)/y, and thus that the Gini coefficient
can be computed based on the information contained in vector y alone. Moreover, it is always the case that
ybottom ≤ ytop for objective wage data. Thus qbottom is always smaller than or equal to fbottom and, consequently,
G always lies between 0 and fbottom.
6The conceptual distinction between individuals’ inequality perceptions and their distributional norms is
prevalent in the sociological literature; see Jasso (1980) or Osberg and Smeeding (2006) among many others.
7Even though one can imagine that individuals also have different perceptions and/or norms about the
population shares of the two groups, I will treat them as fixed parameters, which simply implies that fbottom
does not vary across individuals. The main reason for doing so is that there is no adequate information in the
survey which could be used to plausibly approximate individuals’ perceptions of population shares. Moreover,
treating fbottom as a fixed parameter also makes it possible to exclusively focus on differences in wage estimates
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thus end up with two distinct distributions of inequality indices in the case of subjective wage
estimates, while it is possible to measure objective wage inequality with one single number only.
Formally, assume that the following two triplets of information are observed for each re-
spondent – perfectly analogous to the case of objective wage information, besides the two
modifications discussed above (compare with equation (1)):
y(i)actual ≡
(
y(i)actual
bottom
, y(i)actual
top
, fbottom
)
, and (3a)
y(i)ethical ≡
(
y(i)ethical
bottom
, y(i)ethical
top
, fbottom
)
, (3b)
with y(i)actual denoting the set of information that describes an individual’s perception of the
actual wage distribution and with y(i)ethical referring to those wages that she would judge as
fair.8 Based on (3a) and (3b), respectively, the corresponding individual-level Gini coefficients
can be easily computed as follows:
G(i)actual = fbottom − q(i)
actual
bottom
, and (4a)
G(i)ethical = fbottom − q(i)
ethical
bottom
, (4b)
where q(i)actual
bottom
denotes the actual share of the total wage bill going to the bottom group
and q(i)ethical
bottom
denotes the wage share that the bottom group judges as fair. Thus, as in the
case of objective wage data, the Gini coefficient is simply given by the difference between the
population share of the bottom group and the wage share of the bottom group.9 G(i)actual
and G(i)ethical represent, respectively, individual perceptions of inequality in market wages and
distributional norms with respect to market wages (inequality perceptions and distributional
norms, for short).
since, if fbottom is treated as a fixed parameter across individuals, all variation in the two subjective inequality
measures must be due to variation in subjective wage estimates.
8Appendix B details how the different components of equations (3a) and (3b) can be estimated from
individual-level wage estimates for people working in different occupations that are available in the ISSP data.
9In principle, the two subjective Gini coefficients can take on negative values (in contrast to the Gini coef-
ficient describing objective wage data) because some individuals may think that the wage share of the bottom
group is actually larger than their population share (i.e. q(i)wbottom can take on any value between zero and one).
As shown in table 2 below, this is indeed true for a tiny fraction of the sample (0.1% in the case of actual and
0.5% in the case of ethical wage estimates).
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If both inequality perceptions and distributional norms are observed for the same individual,
it is also possible to define an individual’s redistributive preferences as her desired relative
reduction in the perceived level of inequality in market wages:
R(i) =
(
1−
G(i)ethical
G(i)actual
)
, (5)
with G(i)actual and G(i)ethical as defined in equation (4a) and (4b), respectively. Note that a
positive demand for some equalization of market wages can only arise if the evaluation of
ethical wages differs from the perceived distribution of market wages.10 Finally, note that
R(i) measures only the potential demand for redistribution because the measure does not
directly imply that individuals actually desire that the distribution of market wages be adjusted
according to their evaluations. Thus, while R(i) is directly informative about the discrepancy
between individuals’ perceptions of actual wage inequality and their normative views of the fair
distribution of wages, it is not necessarily informative regarding their beliefs that something
should be done to eliminate this discrepancy, or even more specifically that the state should
intervene correspondingly. It may thus be more appropriate to think of R(i) as a measure of
individuals’ normative assessment of market justice, or rather the absence of market justice,
with values of R(i) close to (far from) zero indicating a strong (weak) belief in market justice.
4 The Diversity of Inequality Perceptions, Distributional
Norms, and Redistributive Preferences
4.1 Main Distributional Features
I first present some simple descriptive statistics related to individuals’ inequality perceptions
and their distributional norms in the data pooled across all countries and years, fleshing out the
most important distributional features of the two subjective inequality indices and redistributive
preferences.
10Note that the demand for equalization of market wages can take on negative values, namely if the ethical
inequality index is larger the perceived inequality index. The demand for equalization of market wages can also
be larger than one if either G(i)actual or G(i)ethical takes on a negative value (cf. footnote 9).
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Table 2
These statistics are shown in table 2. Panel (a) first shows the estimated fraction of individ-
uals (in any given country and survey year) who are classified as belonging to the bottom group
of wage earners, fbottom. The estimated population share of the bottom group equals 77% on
average, varying between a low of about 57% (Canada, 1992) to a high of almost 92% (Poland,
1992). The average actual wage share of the bottom (top) group amounts to 42% (58%), while
the average ethical wage share is about 54% (about 46%).11
Panel (b) shows descriptives for the two subjective inequality indices. Average inequality
perception equals 0.451 across all countries/regions and years. Also note that there is not one
single individual who does not perceive any wage differentials at all (this is indicated by the
fact that the fraction of individuals who perceive the wages of the bottom group to be the
same as the wages of the top group is zero). At the same time, average ethical inequality only
amounts to 0.301, i.e. the ethical level of inequality is about a third lower than the perceived
level. Moreover, note that only few individuals (less than 1%) judge absolute equality as fair,
as can be seen from the fraction of individuals with an ethical inequality of zero.12
Panel (c) shows that people favor a more equal distribution of market wages across occu-
pations than the distribution they perceive to actually exist (on average by about one-third).
Indeed, the overwhelming majority (roughly 90%) of individuals has a positive demand for
some equalization of wages, while only a small fraction of the sample has no or even a nega-
tive demand for equalizing market wages (about 8.2% and 1.6%, respectively).13 At the same
time, table 2 also shows that only a few individuals (less than 1%) would like to eliminate all
differences in wages across different occupations (i.e. have a demand for equalization of market
11One interesting feature not evident in table 2 is the fact that the overall ethical wage is on average lower
than the overall actual wage in most countries and years.
12It seems worth mentioning that the overall averages of the two subjective Gini coefficients are surprisingly
close to mean levels of inequality before and after taxes and transfers, respectively (see appendix table A.1).
While I certainly do not want to stress this feature too much, not the least because subjective measures relate
to individual wages while the objective measures relate to household incomes, the similarity between mean
inequality perceptions and inequality before taxes and transfers does suggest that individuals appear to have,
on average, relatively realistic perceptions of wages for people working in different occupations. See also Osberg
and Smeeding (2006) on this issue.
13A negative demand for equalizing market wages is suggestive of a desired regressive transfer. In most cases,
however, a negative value simply results from an individual’s desire to increase both the wage of the bottom
and the top group, but with a larger desired relative increase for the top group (note that overall perceived
wages may be different from overall ethical wages; cf. footnote 11).
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wages exactly equal to one).
4.2 Differences Across Regions and Countries
I will next look at differences in these measures across broadly defined regions, as well as over
countries within these regions, and across time. Indeed, one of the most recurrent themes
in the existing literature is the pronounced difference between Europe and the US regarding
redistributive preferences (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 2001). I thus start
with a comparison between the Anglo-American and the European countries (while separating
Eastern and Western European countries, however).
Figure 1
The upper three panels of figure 1 show density estimates of inequality perceptions, distri-
butional norms, and redistributive preferences for each the three regions. The densities differ
markedly, and in the expected direction, from each other for each of the three measures. First,
as shown in panel (a), individuals in the Anglo-American countries perceive much higher wage
inequality than both Eastern and Western Europeans. The figure also shows, however, that the
distribution of inequality perceptions among Eastern Europeans is very different from those of
Western Europeans. Panel (b) shows that Europeans are much less tolerant towards inequality
than individuals from Anglo-American countries, but also that the tolerated wage inequality is
lowest among Eastern Europeans. Regarding redistributive preferences, panel (c) shows that
individuals from the Anglo-American countries indeed have the lowest demand for equalization
of market wages, and that Western Europeans tend to have less demand for equalization of
market wages than Eastern Europeans.
However, as Osberg and Smeeding (2006) and others point out, there is considerable hetero-
geneity among European and Anglo-American countries as well. The remaining three panels of
figure 1 illustrate the heterogeneity in perceptions and beliefs across countries within the three
broader regions. Each panel shows country-specific density estimates of the demand for equal-
ization of market wages (similar regional variation is found for the two subjective inequality
measures; results not shown, however). Only two countries within each region are specifically
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marked for better readability. Panel (d) shows density estimates among the group of West-
ern European countries. In this region, Sweden and Switzerland represent the two extreme
distributions, while the remaining countries all fall somewhere between these two countries.
Correspondingly, East Germany and Hungary represent the two extremes among the Eastern
European countries, shown in panel (e), and so do Northern Ireland and the United States
within the group of Anglo-American countries, as shown in panel (f). Interestingly, it also
appears that there is more heterogeneity in redistributive preferences across both Western and
Eastern Europe than among the group of the Anglo-American countries.
4.3 Distributional Shifts Across Time
Because there are surveys from three different years (i.e. 1987, 1992, and 1999) focusing on
questions of social inequality, it is also possible to assess whether individuals’ perceptions and
normative beliefs have changed over time. However, because only few countries participated
in all three surveys, the significance of the corresponding evidence remains somewhat limited.
Figure 2 shows density estimates of the demand for equalization of market wages and the two
subjective inequality indices, respectively, by year of survey.14
Figure 2
The first two panels of figure 2 show substantial shifts over time in the distribution of
both inequality perceptions and distributional norms. Specifically, inequality perceptions have
unambiguously increased over time, as shown in panel (a). This upward shift in inequality
perceptions parallels the evolution of the effective level of inequality in most OECD countries
(e.g. Atkinson, 2008).15 At the same time, however, panel (b) shows that the ethical level
of inequality has also risen, thus counteracting the upward trend in the perceived level of
wage inequality. This is an interesting result, suggesting that the increase in the effective
level of inequality was paralleled by a shift towards increasing tolerance to inequality in market
14For drawing this figure I restrict the sample to observations from those countries/regions that participated
in all three surveys: Australia, West Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, and the United States.
15Also note that there was a bimodal distribution in 1987 that vanished over time. The bimodality is driven
by Hungary, the only Eastern European country that participated in the 1987 survey. This in turn implies that
subjective evaluations in Hungary must have converged towards the distribution of the other countries over
time.
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wages. In fact, several authors have argued that such changes in social norms are one important
component in understanding the recent rise income inequality (Atkinson, 2003; Levy and Temin,
2007; Piketty and Saez, 2006). Because the distribution of both subjective inequality indices
tends to shift upwards over time, they partially cancel each other. As a result, there is actually
not much change in the distribution of redistributive preferences over time, as shown in panel
(c) of figure 2.
5 Redistributive Preferences and the Effective Level of
Inequality and Redistribution
5.1 Baseline Estimates
The next step is to see whether these differences in inequality perceptions, distributional norms,
and redistributive preferences across countries and over time are systematically related to cor-
responding differences in objective measures of redistribution and/or after tax-and-transfer
inequality. I begin my examination of this issue by running a series of simple regression models
that take the following basic form:
ωjt = β0 +Rjtβ1 + ǫjt, or (6a)
ωjt = β0 +G
actual
jt β2 +G
ethical
jt β3 + ǫjt, (6b)
with the dependent variable ωjt being either the difference between the Gini coefficient in
disposable household income before and after taxes and transfer payments, ∆Gjt, total social
expenditure as a percentage share of GDP, SocExpit, or simply the Gini coefficient in disposable
household income after taxes and transfer payments, Gafterjt in country j and year t. For the
moment, the only regressor in most of the specifications shown is the average demand for
redistribution within country/region j and year t, denoted by Rjt, and thus the parameter of
key interest in most cases is given by β1 (see equation (6a)). In some of the specifications,
however, I include the mean values of the two subjective inequality indices as main regressors,
as indicated by equation (6b). In this case, parameters β2 and β3 are of main interest. The
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resulting parameter estimates, for both kind of specification, are given in table 3.
Table 3
The first column shows parameter estimates from a regression of ∆Gjt on Rjt only. The
regression yields a statistically significant point estimate of 0.373 (t-value of about 2.56). Note
that the estimated coefficient on Rjt implies a substantive quantitative association between
redistributive preferences and the difference in the Gini coefficient. In fact, the approximate
elasticity of ∆Gini with respect to redistributive preferences equals about 0.74 (= (0.373 ·
0.319)/0.161). The specification in the second column includes country×year means of the two
subjective inequality indices, G
actual
jt and G
ethical
jt , instead of average redistributive preferences.
Both coefficients have the expected sign, with a positive coefficient on inequality perceptions
and a negative coefficient on distributional norms, and even though they are both insignificant
individually, they are jointly significant (see the corresponding F-statistic shown in the bottom
row of table 3).
The next two columns show analogous regression specifications for SocExpit as dependent
variable, arguably a more direct measure of redistribution than ∆Gjt. As above, however, there
is a large positive and significant association between redistributive preferences and overall
social expenditure. The approximate elasticity is equal to about 0.5 (= (33.451 ·0.319)/21.253)
in this case, smaller than in the case of ∆Gjt, but still surprisingly large. There is also a similar
pattern when inequality perceptions and distributional norms are included as regressors, as
shown in the fourth column. There is a positive but insignificant effect of inequality perceptions
and a negative and significant effect of distributional norms on total social expenditure.
The remaining columns of table 3 show results using the after tax-and-transfer inequality
in disposable household income, Gafterjt , as the dependent variable. In the fifth column, both Rjt
and Gbeforejt are included as regressors. The resulting point estimate on Rjt in this specification
equals -0.352 (with a t-value of about -3.14). Note that, holding inequality before taxes and
transfers constant, a negative effect of redistributive preferences on the Gini coefficient after
taxes and transfers is consistent with a positive association between redistributive preferences
and the difference between inequality before and after taxes/transfers. The sixth column shows,
however, that virtually the same estimate results if only Rjt is included as regressor. The
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corresponding estimates suggest that redistributive preferences and the Gini coefficient before
taxes/transfers are only weakly correlated with each other. I again include the two subjective
inequality indices instead of redistributive preferences in the seventh column. As before, the
corresponding point estimates are insignificant individually, but the overall F-statistic shows
that they are jointly significant. Even though they are both insignificant, both coefficients
have the expected sign (a positive sign for inequality perceptions and a negative sign in the
case of distributional norms). Finally, because the Giniafter is available for a somewhat larger
sample than the Ginibefore, and because the comparison between the specifications from the
fifth and the sixth column shows that the estimated parameter on Rjt is almost the same,
irrespective of whether Gbeforejt is (also) included as regressor, it is possible to use a slightly
larger sample if Ginibefore is excluded from the set of regressors (i.e. the sample increases from
35 to 38 observations; see table 1). Not surprisingly, using this extended sample yields a
somewhat different point estimate on redistributive preferences (β̂1 = −0.208), but one that is
not statistically different from that obtained from the smaller sample.
5.2 Subjective Inequality Measures and Individuals’ Political Pref-
erences
A closely related question is how individual-level inequality perceptions, distributional norms,
and redistributive preferences are linked to the effective level of inequality and redistribution in
the short run. There are various potential channels linking subjective and objective measures of
inequality and redistribution, but the most likely channel runs from individuals’ redistributive
preferences to their more general political preferences and their voting behavior (e.g. Borck,
2007). In this part of the analysis, I will thus focus on the empirical association between
subjective inequality measures and individuals’ more general political preferences such as their
support for progressive taxation.
Since I can rely on individual-level data in this case, it is possible to apply a standard two-
way fixed-effects regression specification to estimate the strength of the association between
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individuals’ political preferences and their subjective inequality evaluations:
pijt = β0 + xijtβ + ωijtα + ψj + λt + εijt, (7)
where the dependent variable pijt is one of three distinct measures of individuals’ more general
political preferences: either individuals’ stated support for redistribution by the state, their
support for progressive taxation, or a self-assessment of their general political orientation on a
simple scale running from far-left to far-right, labeled conservative political orientation below
(see appendix A for the exact wording of the underlying survey questions). All specifications
either include the two subjective inequality measures or, alternatively, individuals’ assessment
of market justice, denoted by ωijt. Moreover, all specifications include a set of individual-level
controls, denoted by xit, as well as a full set of country and survey-year fixed effects, denoted
by ψj and λt, respectively.
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Table 4
Parameter estimates are shown in 4. The first two columns of table 4 shows results for
individuals’ general support for redistribution by the state. The first column shows that those
individuals with a high demand for equalization of market wages tend to be more likely to
support the redistribution by the state. The corresponding point estimate is statistically sig-
nificant and moreover large in substantial terms. Specifically, evaluated at sample means, the
elasticity of the support for redistribution by the state with respect to the demand for equal-
ization of market wages amounts to about 0.125 (= (0.319 · 0.255)/0.65). The two subjective
inequality indices also yield significant point estimates, as shown in the second column. The
corresponding elasticities are about 0.258 and -0.256, respectively.
The next two columns show analogous results for individuals’ support for progressive tax-
ation. The third column shows a strong and statistically significant association between re-
distributive preferences and individuals’ support for progressive taxation. This shows that
16The full list of individual-level control variables is as follows: a set of four variables describing an individual’s
beliefs about the factors that determine and that should determine one’s income, an individual’s rank within
the income distribution within country j and year t, an index of experienced social mobility in the past ten
years, an individuals’ perception of social conflicts, and a few standard socio-demographic controls such as age
or education. See appendix A for additional details.
16
individuals with a high demand for equalizing market wages are clearly more in favor of pro-
gressive taxation than those with a low demand. Again, the size of the estimated coefficients
is remarkably large, even though much smaller than in the case of one’s general support for
redistribution by the state. The elasticity of support for progressive taxation with respect to
redistributive preferences amounts to 0.047. Not surprisingly, the two subjective inequality
measures are also significantly associated with the support for progressive taxation, as shown
in the fourth column.
Finally, the last two columns report results for individuals’ political self-assessment on a
simple left-right scale, where higher values on the scale denote a more conservative orientation.
As expected, individuals with a higher demand for equalizing market wages are less likely to
think of themselves as having a conservative orientation. Again, besides being statistically
significant, the estimated coefficient turns out to be large in substantive terms. The elasticity
of conservative orientation with respect to the demand for equalization of market wages is
-0.156, while the elasticities with respect to the mean of actual and ethical inequality equal
-0.328 and 0.323, respectively.
5.3 Controlling for Additional Country Characteristics
Taken together, the empirical evidence presented so far is clearly consistent with the view that
we observe different equilibria of redistributive preferences and the effective level of redistribu-
tion across countries and time, with a high (low) demand for redistribution going hand in hand
with a high (low) effective level of redistribution and a low (high) level of after tax-and-transfer
inequality. There is also evidence that redistributive preferences (alternatively, inequality per-
ceptions and distributional norms) are linked to the effective, aggregate level of inequality and
redistribution though individuals’ more general political preferences and their voting behavior.
In the medium and longer run, however, one also needs to explain why countries end up in
one equilibrium and not the other. This will immediately shift our focus to more fundamental,
and often non-economic, factors such as a country’s political institutions. For example, in
a comprehensive review of the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence explaining
the different social security systems of the US and Europe, Alesina and Glaeser (2004, p.3)
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conclude that “(...) economic considerations alone do not go very far in explaining American
exceptionalism”. More specifically, they argue that political institutions and ethnic diversity,
rather than purely economic factors, are the key to ultimately understand the difference between
the US and Europe in terms of after tax-and-transfer inequality and redistribution. I will thus
next examine if the simple association between redistributive preferences and the effective level
of inequality/redistribution still holds if arguably more fundamental country characteristics are
taken into account.
In the following, given the somewhat limited degrees of freedom available for the aggregate-
level analysis, I restrict myself to a few variables that have been prominently discussed in the
existing literature and mainly follow the empirical analysis done by Alesina et al. (2001) and
Alesina and Glaeser (2004). One factor that has received a lot of attention among economists is
the before tax-and-transfer inequality in income, hypothesized to have a positive effect on the
extent of redistribution (e.g. Borge and Rattsø, 2004; Milanovic, 2000).17 The age distribution
in the population has also been suggested as an important explanatory factor, since many
redistributive policies are mechanically linked to the age distribution in the population; pensions
are the most prominent example of this (Galasso and Profeta, 2007; Razin et al., 2002; Tabellini,
2000). Another well-known hypothesis is that countries that are more open to trade redistribute
more because they are exposed to more aggregate income volatility. It is hypothesized that
these countries therefore use redistributive policies to insure individuals against the increased
risk of negative income shocks (e.g. Rodrik, 1998). Moreover, several researchers have argued
that additional, non-economic factors are even more important for our understanding of country
differences in after tax-and-transfer inequality and redistribution. Among the factors identified
as most important are features of a country’s political institutions and especially the existence
of proportional representation (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 2001). It has also
been shown that ethnic fractionalization of the electorate has a strong negative impact on the
extent of redistribution (Alesina et al., 1999; Luttmer, 2001). Finally, the historical experience
17The intuition is based on the median-voter hypothesis (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981), which basically
states that the demand for redistribution is greater, the larger the inequality before taxes and transfers. More-
over, note that treating the before taxes-and-transfer inequality may be elusive because, for example, labor
market regulations and institutions obviously have an impact on the before tax-and-transfer income distribu-
tion and are likely to be associated with individuals’ redistributive preferences.
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of having been exposed to socialist ideology and rule may have had a long-lasting impact on
both (the functioning of) institutions and as well as on individuals’ trust in these institutions
(e.g. Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln, 2007).
Based on these considerations I run a simple variation of the baseline regression specification
from before:
ωjt = β0 +Rjtβ1 + xjtβ + λt + ǫjt, (8)
which corresponds exactly to equation (6a), with the exception that I now take additional
country characteristics xjt as well as survey-year fixed effects λt into account. Moreover, for the
sake of brevity, I focus on redistributive preferences as main regressor in this part of the analysis.
More specifically, based on the arguments above, I include the following set of country-level
controls in all specifications:18 the population share aged 65 or over, openness to trade, a binary
indicator for proportional representation, an index of ethnic fractionalization, and a binary
indicator for countries that were formerly under socialist rule. The Gini coefficient of disposable
household income before taxes and transfers is only included in one of the specifications for the
Gini coefficient after taxes and transfers.19
Table 5
The resulting parameter estimates are given in table 5. The dependent variable in the first
specification is again the difference between the Gini coefficient before and after taxes and
transfer payments, ∆Gini. Controlling for additional country characteristics, the coefficient on
Rjt turns out to be much smaller than in the baseline specification (see table 3). The resulting
point estimate equals -0.049, which is statistically insignificant (t-value of -0.271). In contrast,
however, there is a significant negative coefficient of ethnic fractionalization and a significant
positive coefficient of the dummy variable for former socialist countries. The other coefficients
18See appendix table A.1 for details and data sources.
19In the case of ∆Gini, there is a correlation with Ginibefore simply by construction. Moreover, one may argue
that the Gini coefficient before taxes/transfers is endogenous and should rather be viewed as an additional
outcome (cf. footnote 17). Similarly, average income in a country is arguably endogenous, and I thus only
discuss estimation results without controlling for per-capita income, but I get very similar results if I also
control for a country’s average income (i.e. log per-capita GDP).
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turn out to be statistically insignificant as well. Moreover, note that the model fit is nonetheless
good in the sense that the model has good predictive power overall (R-squared of 0.57 with six
regressors only).
The second column replicates the specification from the first column, but uses total social
expenditure as dependent variable. Similarly, the coefficient on redistributive preferences be-
comes insignificant once additional country characteristics are taken into account. The point
estimate is only about a quarter of the baseline estimate from table 3 above, with a small t-value
of 0.522. Again, most other regressors turn out be insignificant as well, with the exception of
the percentage share of the country’ population that is aged 65 or above in this case.
The remaining three columns show results for the Gini in disposable household income after
taxes and transfer payments. The third column shows a small and insignificant estimate on
redistributive preferences (β̂1 = −0.061, with a t-value of -0.356) as well as on the Gini before
taxes and transfers when additional controls are included. The fourth column again shows
that virtually the same point estimates result if the Gini coefficient in disposable household
income before taxes and transfers is omitted from the list of controls (point estimate of -0.101,
t-value of -0.652). Finally, the fifth column shows results for the same specification but for
the slightly larger sample (as in the baseline estimates). Parameter estimates again turn out
to be very similar. The coefficient on redistributive preferences remains small and statistically
insignificant (the corresponding point estimate equals 0.054, with a t-value of about 0.5).
6 Conclusions
This paper shows that there is considerable variation in individuals’ inequality perceptions,
distributional norms, and redistributive preferences, both within and across countries/regions.
Not surprisingly, individuals from European countries tend to demand more redistribution than
those from Anglo-American countries. However, the descriptive analysis also shows that there
is considerable heterogeneity across different countries from within Eastern or Western Europe
or among the group of Anglo-American countries. There is also evidence of substantial upward
shifts in both inequality perceptions and distributional norms over time (i.e. a shift towards
more tolerance vis-a`-vis inequality in market wages).
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However, the main focus of the empirical analysis is on the empirical association between
the two subjective inequality measures and redistributive preferences on the one hand, and
measures of the effective level of inequality and redistribution on the other hand. I find that
both differences in subjective inequality indices and redistributive preferences are strongly and
significantly associated with objective measures of inequality and redistribution, in line with
the hypothesized equilibrium between redistributive preferences the effective supply of redis-
tribution of the theoretical models outlined in the introduction (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos,
2005; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006). There is also evidence that the subjective and objective
dimension of inequality and redistribution are, at least in part, linked through individuals’
more general political preferences. Indeed, and in line with the evidence of strong associations
between subjective and objective inequality measures, individuals with stronger redistributive
preferences tend to be more likely to be in favor of state intervention in order to reduce the
level of inequality, more likely to be supportive of progressive taxation, as well as less likely to
state a conservative general political orientation.
I finally show that the simple association between redistributive preferences and the ef-
fective level of redistribution or after tax-and-transfer inequality vanishes if additional, and
arguably more fundamental, country characteristics are taken into account. These additional
results suggest that more fundamental and more deeply rooted country characteristics such as
a country’s political institutions explain both country differences in redistributive preferences
(or, alternatively, differences in inequality perceptions and distributional norms) as well as
country differences in the effective level of after-tax/transfer inequality and the effective extent
of redistribution.
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Table 1: Individual and aggregate number of valid observations, by country/region and by year of survey
Country 1987 1992 1999 Total
Australia 1,387 (1,1) 1,956 (1,1) 1,477 (1,1) 4,820 (3,3)
Austria 891 (1,1) 872 (1,1) 1,763 (2,2)
Canada 871 (1,1) 896 (1,1) 1,767 (2,2)
Czech Republic 867 (1,1) 1,665 (1,1) 2,532 (2,2)
France 1,701 (1,1) 1,701 (1,1)
East Germany 861 (1,1) 432 (1,1) 1,293 (2,2)
West Germany 1,153 (1,1) 1,477 (1,1) 737 (1,1) 3,367 (3,3)
Great Britain 1,009 (1,1) 912 (1,1) 621 (1,1) 2,542 (3,3)
Hungary 2,083 (0,0) 1,096 (0,1) 1,000 (0,1) 4,179 (0,2)
Italy 940 (1,1) 940 (1,1)
Netherlands 1,405 (1,1) 1,405 (1,1)
New Zealand 1,091 (1,1) 965 (1,1) 2,056 (2,2)
Northern Ireland 514 (1,1) 514 (1,1)
Norway 987 (1,1) 1,153 (1,1) 2,140 (2,2)
Poland 1,112 (1,1) 895 (1,1) 2,007 (2,2)
Portugal 745 (1,1) 745 (1,1)
Slovakia 1,059 (1,1) 1,059 (1,1)
Spain 720 (0,1) 720 (0,1)
Sweden 574 (1,1) 983 (1,1) 1,557 (2,2)
Switzerland 829 (1,1) 829 (1,1)
United States 1,184 (1,1) 843 (1,1) 991 (1,1) 3,018 (3,3)
Total 9,941 (7,7) 13,587 (12,13) 17,426 (16,18) 40,954 (35,38)
Notes: The table shows individual and aggregate (in parentheses) number of observations. Valid
observations at the individual-level are those with non-missing values on the two subjective in-
equality indices. Valid observations at the aggregate level are those with non-missing values on
both before and after tax-and transfer inequality and on after tax-and-transfer inequality only,
respectively (first and second number in parentheses, respectively).
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Table 2: Subjective inequality indices and redistributive preferences, descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation
(a) Moments of subjective wage distributions
Population shares
Population share, bottom group 0.774 0.082
Population share, top group 0.226 0.082
Wage shares
Actual wage share, bottom group 0.430 0.174
Actual wage share, top group 0.570 0.174
Ethical wage share, bottom group 0.544 0.166
Ethical wage share, top group 0.456 0.166
(b) Subjective inequality indices
Inequality perceptions 0.451 0.192
1(Actual Gini < 0) 0.001 0.025
1(Actual Gini = 0) 0.000 0.000
1(Actual Gini > 0) 0.999 0.025
Distributional norms 0.303 0.175
1(Ethical Gini < 0) 0.004 0.060
1(Ethical Gini = 0) 0.006 0.076
1(Ethical Gini > 0) 0.991 0.096
(c) Redistributive preferences
Demand for equalization of market wages 0.322 0.269
1(Demand < 0) 0.072 0.259
1(Demand = 0) 0.017 0.129
1(Demand > 0) 0.911 0.285
1(Demand = 1) 0.006 0.076
1(Demand > 1) 0.003 0.056
Notes: All numbers refer to the data pooled across all countries/regions and years (n =
40, 954). 1(·) denotes the indicator function, taking the expression in parentheses as
argument. Variable definitions are given in the main text (see section 3).
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Table 3: Subjective inequality indices, redistributive preferences, inequality, and redistribution
∆Gini SocExp Giniafter
Mean 0.161 0.161 21.253 21.253 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.297
Standard deviation 0.055 0.055 4.748 4.748 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044
Redistributive preferences 0.373⋆⋆ 33.452⋆ −0.352⋆⋆⋆ −0.344⋆⋆⋆ −0.208⋆
(0.146) (18.048) (0.112) (0.111) (0.108)
Ginibefore 0.263
⋆
(0.146)
Inequality perceptions 0.299 44.811 −0.035
(0.357) (31.991) (0.248)
Distributional norms −0.619 −71.315⋆ 0.326
(0.383) (39.267) (0.301)
Constant 0.042 0.218⋆⋆⋆ 10.596⋆ 23.051⋆⋆⋆ 0.288⋆⋆⋆ 0.406⋆⋆⋆ 0.210⋆⋆⋆ 0.365⋆⋆⋆
(0.047) (0.057) (5.687) (4.119) (0.079) (0.035) (0.026) (0.035)
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 38
p-value (F-statistic) 0.015 0.012 0.073 0.057 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.062
R-Squared 0.155 0.234 0.166 0.200 0.254 0.192 0.355 0.097
Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Variable definitions are
given in the main text (section 3) and appendix table A.1.
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Table 4: Subjective inequality indices, redistributive preferences, and political preferences
Support for Support for Conservative
redistribution by the state progressive taxation political orientation
Mean 0.625 0.625 0.770 0.770 0.339 0.339
Standard deviation 0.484 0.484 0.421 0.421 0.473 0.473
Redistributive preferences 0.289⋆⋆⋆ 0.121⋆⋆⋆ −0.192⋆⋆⋆
(0.009) (0.008) (0.012)
Inequality perceptions 0.417⋆⋆⋆ 0.266⋆⋆⋆ −0.269⋆⋆⋆
(0.017) (0.016) (0.023)
Distributional norms −0.633⋆⋆⋆ −0.272⋆⋆⋆ 0.352⋆⋆⋆
(0.019) (0.018) (0.024)
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 39,803 39,803 38,582 38,582 24,244 24,244
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-Squared 0.191 0.190 0.056 0.058 0.103 0.102
Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.
See appendix A for the full list of and additional information on individual-level controls.
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Table 5: Controlling for additional country characteristics
∆Gini SocExp Giniafter
Mean 0.161 21.253 0.296 0.296 0.297
Standard deviation 0.055 4.748 0.045 0.045 0.044
Redistributive preferences −0.026 7.690 −0.050 −0.061 0.099
(0.193) (14.732) (0.157) (0.141) (0.110)
Ginibefore 0.123
(0.256)
Population share 65+ −0.005 1.374⋆⋆⋆ −0.005 −0.006⋆⋆ −0.005⋆
(0.005) (0.362) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness 0.021 1.548 −0.049⋆⋆⋆ −0.053⋆⋆ −0.065⋆⋆⋆
(0.032) (3.633) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022)
Proportional representation 0.025 2.725 −0.050⋆⋆ −0.054⋆⋆⋆ −0.048⋆⋆
(0.020) (1.731) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Ethnic fractionalization −0.128⋆⋆ −1.730 −0.033 −0.056 −0.020
(0.049) (4.683) (0.061) (0.038) (0.039)
East 0.049⋆⋆ −0.714 −0.013 −0.008 −0.010
(0.019) (1.814) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013)
Constant 0.212⋆⋆⋆ −3.454 0.393⋆ 0.478⋆⋆⋆ 0.412⋆⋆⋆
(0.073) (6.668) (0.191) (0.051) (0.050)
Survey-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 35 35 35 35 38
p-value (F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-Squared 0.583 0.628 0.591 0.587 0.527
Notes: ⋆, ⋆⋆, ⋆⋆⋆ denotes statistical significance on the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors are
given in parentheses. Variable definitions are given in the main text (section 3) and appendix table A.1.
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Figure 1: Subjective inequality measures, by region or by country within region
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Notes: Panels (a) to (c) show density estimates by broad region, while panels (d) to (f) show density estimates by country (or by region within country); see also
table 1. Variable definitions are given in the main text (see section 3). All density estimates use the Gaussian kernel.
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Figure 2: Subjective inequality measures, by year of survey (selected set of countries only)
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Notes: Figures are based on observations from those countries that participated in all three years only (Australia, former West Germany, Great Britain, Hungary,
and the United States). Variable definitions are given in the main text (see section 3). All density estimates use the Gaussian kernel.
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A Variable Definitions and Data Sources
A.1 Aggregate-level Variables
Inequality and redistribution Mainly due to reasons of data availability, I focus on the
Gini coefficients in disposable household income before and after taxes and transfer payments.
I further use either the difference between the two Gini coefficients or overall social expenditure
(as a percentage share of GDP) as my measure of redistribution.
Aggregate-level controls In the aggregate-level regressions (see section 5.3), I include the
percentage share of the population aged 65 or above, a country’s openness, an indicator if a
country has proportional representation, an index of ethnic fractionalization, and an indicator
if a country was under socialist rule after World War II. See table A.1 for details.
A.2 Political Preferences
Support for redistribution through the state: Individuals’ support for redistribution by
the state is measured by a simple item from the survey: “Do you agree or disagree? It is the
responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high
incomes and those with low incomes.” The possible answers range from 1 (“strongly disagree”)
to 5 (“strongly agree”). In the empirical analysis, I simply use a dichotomized variable taking
on the value 1 if an individual (strongly) agrees with the statement and 0 otherwise.
Support for progressive taxation: Individuals’ support for progressive taxation is mea-
sured by a single survey item: “Do you think people with high incomes should pay a larger share
of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share, or a smaller share?”
Possible answers range from 1 (“much smaller share”) to 5 (“much larger share”). In the
analysis, I again use a dichotomized variable taking on the value 1 if an individual states that
people with high incomes should pay a (much) larger share, and 0 otherwise.
Conservative orientation: Individuals’ stated political orientation on a simple left-right
scale. “Based on your current voting intention, would you consider yourself left-wing or right-
wing?” Possible answer categories range from 1 (“far left”) to 5 (“far right”). In the analysis
I use a dichotomized variable taking on the value 1 if an individual calls him- or herself (far)
right.
A.3 Individual-level Regressors
I use three sets of regressors to model the variation in individuals’ more general political pref-
erences (section 5.2): (i) variables which describe the factors that do or ought to determine
actual pay from the individuals’ point of view, (ii) variables describing individuals’ self-interest
in redistribution or economic variables mediating self-interest in redistribution, and (iii) addi-
tional control variables which potentially correlate with unobserved determinants of subjective
inequality measures (like risk aversion, for example).
Belief that needs should be important: This variable is meant to capture the extent
to which an individual thinks that one’s needs should be important in determining his or her
income (need principle). This variable is constructed from the following two questions about
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the factors that should be important in determining one’s pay: “In deciding how much people
ought to earn, how important should each of these things be, in your opinion? (i) What is
needed to support your family. (ii) Whether the person has children to support.”
Belief that effort should be important: This variable is meant to capture the equity
principle and is constructed from five questions about which factors should be important in
determining pay: “In deciding how much people ought to earn, how important should each of
these things be, in your opinion? (i) How much responsibility goes with the job. (ii) The number
of years spent in education and training. (iii) Whether the job requires supervising others. (iv)
How well he or she does the job. (v) How hard he or she works at the job.”
Perception that ascribed skills are important: This variable measures the extent to
which a person beliefs in ascribed factors as being important in determining the amount of
compensation. This question relates to the perception of individuals of which factors actually
are important for getting ahead. “We have some questions about opportunities for getting
ahead: (i) How important is coming from a wealthy family? (ii) Knowing the right people?”
Perception that acquired skills are important: This variable measures if an individual
thinks that acquired skills are actually important in determining one’s pay. The variable is the
sum of over two different questions: “We have some questions about opportunities for getting
ahead: (i) Do you agree or disagree? In [country], people get rewarded for their effort. (ii) In
[country], people get rewarded for their intelligence and skills.”
Income: An individual’s personal net monthly income, expressed as the rank of an individual
within the income distribution in a given country and year (to remove different scaling).
Social mobility: There are two simple questions about individuals’ self-perception of the
position today and ten years ago: “(i) In our society, there are groups which tend to be towards
the top and groups which tend to be toward the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to
bottom. Where would you put yourself on this scale? (ii) And ten years ago, where did you
fit then?” Both are measured on a scale from 1 (bottom) to 10 (top). The mobility index is
simply defined as the difference between the two scores (i.e. position today minus position ten
years ago).
Perception of social conflicts: This variable measures individuals’ perceptions of conflicts
within society. Included items are questions about the existence of conflicts between: “In
all countries, there are differences or even conflicts between different social groups. In your
opinion, In [country] how much conflict is there between...: (i) Poor people and rich people?
(ii) The working class and the middle class? (iii) Management and workers? (iv) People at
the top of society and people at the bottom? (v) Young people and older people?”
Socio-demographic controls: The remaining controls that are used in the analysis are
self-explanatory: Age (in years), highest attained education (in years), gender, occupation
(dummy variables denoting major occupational group according to the International Stan-
dard Classification of Occupations), and employment status (employment, unemployment, and
nonemployment).
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Table A.1: Definition, basic descriptives and data source for aggregate-level variables
Variable label Definition Mean Standard deviation Source
Ginibefore Gini of disposable household income, 0.457 0.043 World Income Inequality Database
before taxes and transfers
Giniafter Gini of disposable household income, 0.296 0.045 World Income Inequality Database
after taxes and transfers
∆Gini Ginibefore - Giniafter 0.161 0.055 World Income Inequality Database
SocExp Overall social expenditure (% of GDP) 21.253 4.748 World Bank
Popshare 65+ Percentage of population aged 65 or older 13.991 2.058 World Bank
Openness Export share (exports as share of GDP) 0.595 0.249 World Bank
+ import share (imports as share of GDP)
Proportional representation Indicator variable (= 1 if country has 0.686 0.471 Database of Political Institutions
proportional representation)
Ethnic fractionalization Probability that two randomly chosen 0.222 0.188 World Bank
individuals have different ethnicity
East Indicator variable (= 1 if country has been 0.200 0.406 -
under socialist rule after World War II)
Notes: All descriptives refer to the sample of observations for which the Gini in disposable household income both before and after taxes and transfer payments
is observed (n = 35, see also table 1).
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B Estimating the Components of Subjective Gini Coef-
ficients
B.1 Subjective Wage Estimates
The most fascinating data available in the ISSP surveys focusing on social inequality are indi-
viduals’ subjective estimates of actual and ethical wages for people working in various specific
occupations such as a bus driver, a skilled worker in a factory, or a doctor in general practice.
More specifically, individuals were asked to estimate what they thought to be the actual wage
of people working in different occupations and what they thought people in these occupations
ought to be paid from their point of view, denoted as actual and ethical wage estimates for
short in the following (original wording from the source questionnaire):
“We would like to know what you think people in these jobs actually earn. Please write
how much you think they actually earn each month (before taxes, but after social security
contributions). Many people are not exactly sure about this, but your best guess will be
close enough.”
“Next, what do you think people in these jobs ought to be paid. How much do you think they
should earn each month (before taxes, but after social security contributions), regardless
of what they actually earn.”
Table B.1 contains the full list of occupations for which subjective wage estimates are available
(along with the original description of the various occupations in the survey). In the following
I briefly describe how I aggregate these wage estimates so that they fit equation (3a) and (3b),
respectively. Additional details concerning the conceptual framework are available from Kuhn
(2011).
B.2 Group-Specific Wages
I first assign each occupation for which individual wage estimates are available to either the
bottom or the top group of wage earners:
bottom ={unskilled worker, farm worker, shop assistant, secretary, bank clerk,
bus driver, skilled worker, bricklayer, owner of a small shop} (B.1a)
top ={doctor, lawyer,minister, judge, chairman, owner of a factory} (B.1b)
Based on this simple classification, group-specific wage estimates (actual and ethical) are con-
structed as simple within-group averages of occupation-specific wage estimates:
y(i)w
bottom
=
∑
15
j=1
1(j ∈ bottom)y(i)wj∑
15
j=1
1(j ∈ bottom)1(y(i)wj 6= ∗)
, and (B.2a)
y(i)w
top
=
∑
15
j=1
1(j ∈ top)y(i)wj∑
15
j=1
1(j ∈ top)1(y(i)wj 6= ∗)
, (B.2b)
with y(i)wj denoting an individual’s actual or ethical wage estimate for people working in occu-
pation j, with w ∈ {actual, ethical}, and with ∗ denoting a missing wage estimate. As indicated
by the second indicator function in the denominator, group-specific wages can be computed for
any single individual as long as he or she gives at least one wage estimate per group (i.e. at
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least one wage estimate for the top group and at least one estimate for the bottom group). This
procedure can also easily take care of the fact that the list of occupations has changed over
time and that wage estimates for all fifteen occupations are available only in 1992 and only for
a few countries (see appendix table B.1).
B.3 Fraction of Individuals Belonging to the Bottom Group
Finally, the fraction of individuals belonging to the bottom group is estimated from the distri-
bution of individuals across occupations in the sample:
fbottom =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1(iscoi ∈ [3, 9]), (B.3)
with iscoi denoting an individual’s major occupational code according to the International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). According to this classification, major group
1 consists of “legislators, senior officials and managers” and major group 2 of “professionals”.
Note that I estimate a different fbottom for each pair of country and year. As mentioned above,
however, within any pair of country×year the size of the two groups is the same for all indi-
viduals and the same for both the distribution of actual and ethical wages. In fact, however,
estimated group shares do not change much over time and thus results would hardly change if
I would allow the population shares to vary only across countries only (but not over time).
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Table B.1: Subjective Wage Estimates for People Working in Specific Occupations
Occupation Abbreviation 1987 1992 1999
“An unskilled worker in a factory” Unskilled worker X X X
“A bricklayer ” Bricklayer X (X)
“A shop assistant in a department store” Shop assistant X X
“A farm worker” Farm worker X X
“A secretary” Secretary X (X)
“A bus driver” Bus driver X (X)
“A skilled worker in a factory” Skilled worker X X X
“A bank clerk” Bank clerk X (X)
“The owner of a small shop ” Shop owner X X
“A lawyer” Lawyer X X
“A doctor in general practice” Doctor X X X
“The owner-manager of a large factory” Owner of a factory X X
“A cabinet minister in the national government” Minister X X X
“A judge in [country’s highest court]” Judge X X
“The chairman of a large national company” Chairman X X X
“Your own occupation” Own occupation X
Notes: The first column contains the original wording from the ISSP source questionnaire. The second
column lists the corresponding abbreviations used in the figures and tables. (X) denotes that wage
estimates in the 1992 survey are available for a couple of countries (i.e. Australia, Sweden, and Slovenia)
only.
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